The Canadian Perspective
14. Canadian interests covered the full range of subjects dealt with
in the Conference to a degree greater than a great many of the other
participants. Fisheries, pollution, deep seabed exploitation, dispute
settlement--even the archipelagic issues involved Canada, in view of the
Arctic archipelago that falls within Canadian boundaries. The following
are only a few illustrative examples.
15. Canada had already identified valuable hydrocarbon deposits in its
east coast continental shelf (which extends, off Newfoundland, much farther
into the ocean than most shelves). Canada wanted to keep the benefits
from these resources as much as possible to itself, particularly for the
province of Newfoundland for which new resources were particularly
important (UNCLOS would, in the end, provide a sharing arrangement for
areas outside 200 nautical
miles.[9]) In terms of deep
seabed resources Canada had two major concerns: that deep seabed mineral
exploitation, with its expected nickel output, might undermine world nickel
prices with effects on Canadian mining companies and communities; and that
the legal regime adopted for deep seabed exploitation should be adequate to
protect the rights of private enterprises, expected to include Canadian
companies, in establishing and exploiting minesites.
16. Concerning living resources, the Canadian coastal areas in the
Pacific and Atlantic held some of the richest fish resources in the
world. When the United Nations Conference began in 1973 Canada's east
coast territorial sea and fishing zones totalled 70,600 square miles.
With extension to 200 nautical miles they would encompass 673,000 square
nautical miles, in which 96% of the total fish catch by Canadian and
other fleets fishing off the east coast of Canada had been taken. On
the Pacific coast, the Canadian territorial sea and fishing zones would
expand from 46,600 square nautical miles to
135,546.[10]
17. On the east coast the resources had, for centuries, attracted
fishing vessels from many countries. In the period following 1958 a
growing array of new participants from East and West Europe joined
the traditional operators from West Europe. The total foreign capacity
dramatically increased while the Canadian capacity remained fairly
stable.[11] The combined
Canadian and foreign catches became a serious problem, with significant
stock declines appearing by the early
'70s.[12] The international
fisheries management organization in place from the late 1940s, the
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF)
was ineffective in preventing these
declines[13] and unlikely to be
able to reverse them.
18. The Canadian government had the same views on what had to be done
as did numerous other coastal States with similar problems: extension
of jurisdiction to establish control over fishing for the stocks, to
keep catches within the limits required for conservation, and to obtain
the maximum possible preferential share of the catches for the coastal
fishermen. The group of coastal States thinking along these lines at
the UN Conference were numerous, and influential. They included, besides
Canada, the U.S., Russia, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand,
Norway, Iceland and many others. The Canadian approach, however, varied
from that of most of the other coastal States, because the 200 nautical
mile limit considered by most as the maximum extension necessary did not
encompass significant areas of fish habitat off Canada's Atlantic coast.
Most of these areas outside 200 nautical miles provide habitat for fish
stocks located primarily inside 200 nautical miles, but which extend, for
part of the year, outside 200 nautical miles.
19. The fishing grounds off Canada's Atlantic coast, called the "Grand
Banks", extend well beyond 200 nautical miles in two areas, the northern
area called the "Nose" and the southern area called the "Tail" of the
Grand Banks. The fish habitat outside 200 nautical miles encompasses
327,000 square nautical miles, as compared with the 673,000 square
nautical miles landwards of this
limit.[14] This situation
resulted in Canadian proposals, supported primarily by Argentina which
has a similar situation, aimed at providing coastal State control beyond
200 nautical miles in the special situations where this made sense in
fisheries management terms. These efforts did not, however, succeed.
20. At the time the 200 nautical mile limit was being proposed only 4%
of the total catches off Canada's east coast, by Canada and all other
countries, took place outside 200 nautical
miles.[15] This fact led
one writer at the time to note "...while these areas beyond 200 miles
should be an integral part of any management zone for Canada, their
exclusion should not be too detrimental for effective
management".[16] (This
conclusion did not, however, turn out to be correct; the problems which
developed are described later in this paper.)
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